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Abstract
This paper studies eﬃcient tax policies in Ramsey’s tradition when consumers face temp-
tation and self control problems in inter-temporal decision making. We embed the class of
preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a simple two-period life-cycle model and
show that education should be eﬀectively subsidized if the elasticity of the earnings function
is increasing in education and if temptation problems are suﬃciently severe. By contrast,
if temptation problems are not suﬃciently severe, eﬃcient education policy calls for tax-
ing education. Moreover, eﬃcient labor taxation calls for subsidizing qualiﬁed labor if the
strength of temptation is suﬃciently large.
Keywords: temptation, self control, second-best eﬃcient taxation, inverse elasticity rule,
education policy
JEL-Classiﬁcation: D91, H21, I28, J24
1 Introduction
Individuals face self control problems and temptation in inter-temporal decision making. The
analysis of these phenomena has recently received much attention in both the experimental and
theoretical literature1. Many experimental studies, for example, have documented preference
reversals for inter-temporal choices (see Frederick et al. (2002) for an overview). Speciﬁcally, if
subjects are asked to choose between a large and delayed reward and a smaller immediate one,
they tend to prefer the latter whereas for two delayed rewards subjects are more likely to prefer
the later and larger one. Provided that the subjects’ preferences are stationary, this evidence
implies that the same inter-temporal trade-oﬀ is resolved diﬀerently depending on when the
decision is implemented (on what date the reward is received). From a theoretical point of
∗Forthcoming in Metroeconomica.
†We thank Wolfram F. Richter for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank two anonymous referees
whose comments and suggestions have undoubtedly helped to improve this article. Finally, Carlos Bethencourt
thanks the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology for Grant ECO2013-48884-C3-3-P for ﬁnancial support.
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1See Lipman and Pesendorfer (2011) for a survey.
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view, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004, 2005) introduce a new class of utility function which
may explain preference reversals over time using time consistent preferences2. More precisely, to
model temptation and self control problems, the utility function by Gul and Pesendorfer consists
of two parts: a commitment utility and a temptation utility. While the ﬁrst part measures
individual preferences on actual consumption choices, the second one measures the preference
on consumption that would have been chosen had the individual succumbed to temptation. The
individual’s actual choice is then a compromise between the commitment utility and the cost
of self control, resulting from deviations from the temptation utility. As a result, the presence
of temptation biasses individuals’ choices towards current consumption which, in turn, implies
that they over-discount the future.
The aim of the present paper is to study optimal tax policies using the preference repre-
sentation by Gul and Pesendorfer. More speciﬁcally, the present paper extends the inverse
elasticity rule of optimal taxation, being usually attributed to Ramsey (1927), when individ-
uals face temptation and self control problems in inter-temporal decision making. In a ﬁrst
step, we study eﬃcient education policies. To do so, we set up a simple two-period life-cycle
model of a representative taxpayer who has to make a static decision on education, saving,
and labor in both the ﬁrst period (non-qualiﬁed labor) and the second period (qualiﬁed labor).
Education causes a monetary cost and, as it takes time, a cost in the forgone income earned
by non-qualiﬁed labor. The source of temptation (the need for immediate gratiﬁcation) is to
over-discount the future. It reduces individual’s incentive to save, to invest into education and
to have high levels of future consumption. Hence, the agent is over-consuming, under-saving
and under-investing in eduction in the ﬁrst period of life.
Recently, Richter (2009, 2011) has shown how the inverse elasticity rule extends to the
context of eﬃcient education policy: Education should eﬀectively be subsidized if the elasticity
of the earnings function is increasing in education.3 The present paper qualiﬁes this conclusion
and shows that it only holds if self control problems are suﬃciently severe. Then, the eﬀect
of temptation is to increase eﬀective subsidization of education relative to non-qualiﬁed labor
provided the social costs of taxation are large. By contrast, if self control problems are not too
2A second modeling approach where agents have time inconsistent preferences has been developed by Laibson
(1997), who in turn builds on the earlier work by Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968).
3The earnings function is a concave function which accounts for the positive impact of education on the return
to qualiﬁed labor. See also Kunze et al. (2013) for an analysis of eﬃcient education policy in the presence of
labor mobility.
2
severe, eﬃcient education policy calls for taxing education.4
The rationale behind this result is the following. The cost of self control is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the temptation utility of the ’most tempting option’, i.e. the utility
of the preferred consumption choice of an individual exerting no self control when it comes
to intertemporal decision making, and the temptation utility of the chosen option. Since the
temptation utility of the ’most tempting option’ is independent of individuals’ decisions, they
will always suﬀer from a (non-controllable) loss of utility. Consequently, a welfare-maximizing
planner trades oﬀ the following objectives: Maximization of the social ability rent, minimization
of the eﬃciency loss resulting from distorted choices of the utility-generating quantities (stan-
dard optimal taxation targets) and the eﬃciency gains resulting from reductions in the cost of
self control (temptation target). While the ﬁrst two targets are addressed by classic optimal
taxation criteria, the temptation target works diﬀerently: In the present framework the social
planner can reduce the cost of self control by transferring resources from the ﬁrst period to
the second one, e.g. by taxing current labor in the ﬁrst period and, simultaneously subsidizing
consumption (and/or saving or education) in the second one. Speciﬁcally, taxing income in the
ﬁrst period makes the value of the agent’s choices worse, but since agents are over-consuming
and under-investing in education, they may also beneﬁt from reductions in their cost of self con-
trol. In particular, the tax can make over-consumption/under-investing less attractive, thereby
reducing the temptation. If this eﬀect is large enough, a tax on current labor makes the agent
better oﬀ.
More precisely, we show that the size of the reduction in the cost of self control depends on
two oﬀsetting mechanisms: First, a tax on non-qualiﬁed labor reduces earnings and consump-
tion, implying a low level of both the temptation utility of the most tempting option and the
temptation utility of the chosen option. Second, it aﬀects individuals’ labor supply decisions:
A decrease in the share of time spent working lowers individuals’ disposable income and thus
consumption but also reduces the disutility of labor (for both the temptation utility of the most
tempting and the chosen option) which, in turn, moderates the utility losses resulting from the
ﬁrst mechanism.5 As individuals smooth consumption over their life-cycle, the total reduction
of the temptation utility of the ’most tempting option’ will always be larger than the reduction
of the temptation utility of the chosen option. Hence, the cost of self control declines, thereby
4Note that our qualitative results are the same as in Richter (2011) when self control problems are absent.
5Note that the term ’disutility’ refers to the commitment utility. As will become clear in section 2, however,
the disutility of labor will be the same for the temptation utility.
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increasing individuals’ welfare. However, the strength of this latter eﬀect depends on the sen-
sitivity of labor supply to the tax rate and so, on the size of the reduction in earnings due to
changes in labor supply. We show that if the elasticity of the marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed
labor, i.e. the reciprocal of the wage elasticity, is suﬃciently small, then the self control cost
reduction is small as well. This would increase the incentive of the social planner to subsidize
consumption in the second period and so, to subsidize education. By contrast, education should
eﬀectively be taxed if the elasticity of the marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed labor is suﬃciently
large and the cost of self control decreases substantially.
Summarizing, the presence of temptation does aﬀect the design of eﬃcient education policies
and results critically depend on how taxation aﬀects the cost of self control.
In a second step, we derive an extended inverse elasticity rule for the eﬃcient taxation
of labor. Again, eﬃcient taxation should increase second period consumption by subsidizing
second period labor supply if the strength of temptation is suﬃciently strong. The intuition
behind this ﬁnding is that a subsidy to second period consumption lowers the attractiveness of
temptation and thus the welfare loss implied by the cost of self control.
The present paper is related to a growing literature on optimal policy design in the presence
of temptation: Kumru and Thanopoulos (2008, 2011) and Kumru and Tran (2012) study the
normative implications of funded and unfunded public pension programmes6 whereas Krusell
et al. (2010) and Bishnu and Wang (2013) examine optimal taxation of capital. These studies
have demonstrated that temptation issues may play a crucial role in the design of optimal
policies. For example, using a neoclassical growth model, Krusell et al. (2010) have shown that
the optimal policy in this framework is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by
impatience. Thus, a subsidy on savings can be used as an instrument to improve welfare because
it makes surrender to temptations less attractive.7 Similarly, the present paper highlights the
6See also Bucciol (2011) and St-Amant and Garon (2015).
7The temptation model (Gul-Peserdorfer’s preferences) is not the unique mechanism to account for preference
reversals. An alternative model that accounts for this type of behavior is the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model
(Laibson, 1997). As noted by Aronsson and Sjögren (2009), however, the literature on optimal taxation and
hyperbolic discounting is quite scarce. One explanation might be the recent popularity of the temptation model,
which preserves the property of time consistency (see Bucciol (2007)) in contrast to Laibson’s time inconsistent
preferences. Bassi (2010) classiﬁes the existent literature into two groups: the ﬁrst group analyzes the eﬀect of
present-biased preferences on consumption-saving decisions (for instance, Krusell et al. (2010)) whereas the second
one studies optimal commodity taxation of addictive goods which are overconsumed by hyperbolic consumers
(O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and Gruber and Köszegi (2004)). The ﬁrst group includes a set of papers that
extend the static Mirrlees (1971)’s model to a dynamic framework with heterogeneous agents and stochastic
shocks (Mikhail Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003), Kocherlakota (2005) and Guo and Krause (2015) among others).
In general, these papers show that it is optimal to discourage saving through taxes. In the second group, taxes
act as commitment mechanisms that help individuals to behave ’correctly’ and to reduce the consumption of
addictive goods.
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role of temptation for eﬃcient tax policies when two simultaneous inter-temporal decisions are
subject to temptation, namely savings and educational investments.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 extends the
elasticity rule for education and labor taxation when consumers face self control problems.
Section 4 shortly concludes.
2 A Representative-Household Model
2.1 Preferences and Temptation
We start by brieﬂy describing the time consistent model of temptation provided by Gul and
Pesendorfer (2004). More precisely, they propose a simple two-period model where, in the ﬁrst
period, the agent takes an action that aﬀects the set of alternatives available in the second period.
Thus, in period 2, the agent must pick a consumption alternative from the set determined in
period 1.
The model takes as given a preference relation over sets of consumption lotteries. Let
c ∈ C, p and B denote consumption in the second period, a consumption lottery and a set
of consumption lotteries, respectively. Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) show that under standard
axioms of preferences and the assumption of set betweenness, there are two von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions u(.) and v(.) such that the expected utility of B is deﬁned as
U(B) = max
p∈B
∫
(u(c) + v(c)) dp−max
p∈B
∫
v(c)dp (1)
The function u(.) represents the agent’s ranking over alternatives when she is committed to
a single choice, whereas her welfare is aﬀected by the temptation utility represented by the
function v(.) when she is not committed to a single choice (note that the v-terms in the above
formula drop out when B is a singleton). However, if the choice set B consists of two elements,
i.e., B = {c, c′}, with u(c) > u(c′) and v(c′) > v(c), and the following inequality holds
u(c′) + v(c′) > u(c) + v(c), (2)
then c′ is called a temptation. In this case, the agent succumbs to the temptation and chooses
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c′ in the second period. She had wished having c as the only available alternative. Similarly, if
u(c) + v(c) > u(c′) + v(c′) (3)
c′ is still a temptation. In this case, however, the agent exercises self-control: she chooses c in
the second period but incurs a loss of utility, i.e. v(c′) − v(c) > 0, which is interpreted as the
cost of self-control.
Hence, the main idea being formalized with self control preferences is that inter-temporal
decisions consist of compromising between the temptation utility and the commitment utility.
In terms of the present paper, an alternative will be a bundle of consumption and non-leisure.
Moreover, the commitment utility will be represented by standard inter-temporal preferences
and thus the household’s desire to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. By contrast, the
temptation utility ranks bundles of a household only according to the immediate utility level
they provide in the present time. Compromising between these two utilities implies that time-
consistent deviations from the household’s own long-term interest are mentally costly. Conse-
quently, households have incentives to choose immediate consumption bundles in order to reduce
the cost of self control. The source of temptation is to over-discount the future in intertemporal
decision making.
2.2 The model
We consider a representative household living for two periods and facing self control problems
in inter-temporal decision making.8 The household’s utility function is assumed to be quasi
linear in ﬁrst-period consumption and additive separable in periodic sub-utilities and second-
period consumption. This is a standard assumption in the literature on optimal taxation which
implies that there are no income eﬀects, see e.g. Diamond (1998) and Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005). Furthermore, it allows one to derive simple elasticity rules which is not feasible in the
present framework with more general preferences (Richter, 2009). Hence, the household’s utility
function is:
U = C1 − V1(L1) + u(C2)− V2(L2) + λ(C1 − V1(L1))− λ max
C˜1,L˜1
(C˜1 − V1(L˜1)) (4)
8The basic model is taken from Richter (2009) and Richter (2011). It is extended to allow for self control
preferences in order to study the impact of self control problems on eﬃcient tax policies.
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where Ci, Li, C˜1 and L˜1 denote consumption, non-leisure time in period i = 1, 2, respectively, as
will be further explained below.9 The functions Vi (i = 1, 2) are strictly increasing and strictly
convex while u is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The parameter λ > 0 captures the
strength of temptation. The commitment utility and the temptation utility of the choice as well
as the maximum temptation utility are given by C1− V1(L1) + u(C2)− V2(L2), λ(C1− V1(L1))
and λ(maxC˜1,L˜1(C˜1−V1(L˜1))), respectively. Hence, the cost of self control (SCC) is deﬁned as:
SCC = λ(max
C˜1,L˜1
(C˜1 − V1(L˜1))− (C1 − V1(L1))) (5)
Clearly, the utility function is increasing in the commitment utility of the choice but decreasing
in the self-control cost.
Denote by Cˆ1 and Lˆ1, respectively, the consumption and labor supply choices of a young
household that decides to exert no self control when time comes to make inter-temporal deci-
sions. This allocation (Cˆ1, Lˆ1) is called the ’most tempting option’. Formally, Cˆ1 and Lˆ1 are
thus the solution to
max
L˜1,S,E
λ(C˜1 − V1(L˜1)) s.t. C˜1 = ω1L˜1 − S − (ω1 + φ)E (6)
where ω1 is the constant ﬁrst period wage rate and S and E denote individual savings and time
spent on education when young, respectively. Note that education causes an opportunity cost in
forgone earnings, ω1E, and a monetary cost of tuition, φE, and that both costs are assumed to
be linear in time. As with this maximization problem, the household does not derive any utility
from future consumption, it follows Sˆ = Eˆ = 0. Consequently, the ’most tempting option’ is
implicitly determined by the following ﬁrst order condition with respect to L˜1
ω1 = V
′
1 (Lˆ1) (7)
and by Cˆ1 = ω1Lˆ1. Clearly, even though Cˆ1 is never chosen, households derive some disutility
9Note that equation (4) implicitly accounts for discounting of future utility. Redeﬁning u(C2) = βu¯(C2) and
V2(L2) = βV¯2(L2) to introduce an explicit discount factor β would leave the results unchanged. Note further that
the speciﬁcation of the utility function implies a quasi concave temptation ranking, which is consistent with the
ﬁndings in Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010), Shah et al. (2012) and Bernheim et al. (2013). It implies that the
cost of self control is more important for poorer than for richer households. Our ﬁndings could be generalized,
however, to allow for more complex functional forms of the temptation ranking, as e.g. in Noor and Takeoka
(2010). While it can be shown that our main carries over to such a framework, analytical complexity increases
dramatically. Hence, in order to derive our main result analytically, we stick to the quasi concave formulation
and leave a more thorough investigation of alternative cases for future research.
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from this option being available at all. Furthermore, it aﬀects welfare through changes in ω1:
A decrease in ω1 (e.g. by taxing non-qualiﬁed labor) reduces the temptation utility of the
’most tempting option’ as the possible level of immediate consumption decreases. In order to
explicitly determine the cost of self control, however, we ﬁrst need to characterize the households’
optimization problem.
The representative household maximizes utility (4) by choosing L1, L2, S and E subject to
L1 ≥ E and the ﬁrst and second period budget constraints:
C1 = ω1L1 − (ω1 + φ)E − S = ω1(L1 − E)− φE − S (8)
and
C2 = ρS + ω2H(E)L2. (9)
where L1 − E is time spent in the market, E is time spent on education and ω1(L1 − E)
denotes ﬁrst period income (non-qualiﬁed labor income).10 The quantities L1 − E and L1 are
thus interpreted as non-qualiﬁed labor and non-qualiﬁed non-leisure, respectively. ω2H(E)L2
denotes second period income (qualiﬁed labor income) and ω2H(E) is the return to second-
period labor, where ω2 is constant while the earnings function H(E) displays positive but
diminishing returns, H ′ > 0 > H ′′. The quantity L2 is interpreted as qualiﬁed labor. Finally,
denote by ρ the gross rate of return to saving. Combining (8) and (9) yields the lifetime budget
constraint:11
C1 + C2/ρ = ω1L1 + ω2H(E)L2/ρ− (φ+ ω1)E. (10)
In the following, we assume that the household’s maximization problem is well behaved so
that there exists an interior unique solution that is diﬀerentiable in ω1, ω2, ρ, φ. The ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to L1, S, L2 and E, respectively, are
ω1 = V ′1(L1) (11)
ρ = (1 + λ)/u′(C2), (12)
(1 + λ)ω2H(E)/ρ = V ′2(L2) (13)
ω2H
′(E)L2/ρ = ω1 + φ (14)
10Alternatively and equivalently, we could assume that the individual has N hours to split between L1 and E.
This would not aﬀect our results.
11Note that the price of consumption is normalized to one.
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Clearly, the higher the strength of temptation, the lower are second period consumption C2,
savings S and the optimal amount of education E.
We assume the second order conditions to be fulﬁlled. This requires some elasticity of the
marginal disutility of labor that is suﬃciently large at the second-best level of L2:
ν2 ≡ L2V ′′2 /V ′2 >
H ′E/H
−H ′′E/H ′ (15)
To see this, let Y (L2) ≡ maxE [ω2HL2/ρ− (ω1 + φ)E] be the ability-rent income. The second-
order condition with respect to L2 then requires:
0 > Y ′′ − V ′′2 =(12) −(1 + λ)
ω2
ρ
H ′2
H ′′L2
− V ′′2 =(13) −
V ′2
H
H ′2
H ′′L2
− V ′′2
⇔ ν2 = L2V ′′2 /V ′2 >
H ′E/H
−H ′′E/H ′ . (16)
Richter (2011) provides an example of an earnings function that satisﬁes all the assumptions
needed in the present paper:
H(E) ≡ hEη¯ +H0 with h > 0, 1 > η¯ > 0, H0 ≥ 0, (17)
This speciﬁcation implies an increasing elasticity of the earnings function, η ≡ EH ′/H, if and
only if H0 > 0 (since η = η¯(1 − H0/H(E))). Furthermore, using (17), equation (15) can be
rewritten as
ν2 ≡ L2V ′′2 /V ′2 > η¯/(1− η¯). (18)
2.3 Welfare Properties: The Cost of Self Control
In contrast to the models analyzed in Richter (2009) and Richter (2011), individuals face temp-
tation in intertemporal decision making. More precisely, individuals are tempted to lower the
associated cost of self control by increasing the fraction of time that they devote to work and
to consume in the ﬁrst period. However, regardless of individuals’ decision, the temptation
utility of the ’most tempting option’ remains unchanged. Consequently, individuals are always
suﬀering from a loss of utility. Yet, a social planner might easily reduce this loss by transferring
resources from the ﬁrst period to the second one. According to that, a government might tax
current labor in the ﬁrst period and, simultaneously subsidize consumption (and/or saving or
education) in the second one.
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But how does a tax on ﬁrst period income aﬀect the cost of self control? As labor supply
decisions are endogenous and individuals smooth consumption over their life-cycle, the eﬀect
on the cost of self control seems to be undetermined a priori: While the maximum temptation
utility declines, as has been argued in the previous subsection, the eﬀect on the temptation
utility from the choice turns out to be ambiguous as individuals increase the amount of leisure
time but also face lower consumption levels. Hence, the net eﬀect on the cost of self control could
either be positive or negative. In order to clarify this ambiguity, we now explicitly determine
the cost of self control.
Comparing equations (7) and (11) reveals that L1 = Lˆ1 whereas C1 < Cˆ1 as long as S > 0
or E > 0. Using (6) and (8), the cost of self control (SCC) is given by12
SCC = λ((Cˆ1 − V1(Lˆ1))− (C1 − V1(L1)))
= λ((ω1Lˆ1 − V1(Lˆ1))− (ω1L1 − V1(L1)− (ω1 + φ)E − S))
= λ((ω1 + φ)E + S). (19)
It is straight forward to show that these costs are unambiguously increasing in φ and ω1.13
Intuitively, lowering the costs of tuition (i.e. reducing φ) decreases the cost of self control as
the marginal temptation-utility of the choice declines. Similarly, decreasing the return to non-
qualiﬁed labor (i.e. decreasing ω1, e.g. by increasing the tax on ﬁrst period income), reduces
the temptation utility of the ’most tempting option’ and the temptation utility from the choice.
However, the net eﬀect turns out to be unambiguously negative. The reason is the following:
Increasing the tax on ﬁrst period income always implies a larger drop in consumption for the
’most tempting option’ than for the actual choice (due to the consumption smoothing motive)
whereas changes in leisure time exactly cancel each other out (as L1 = Lˆ1).
Summarizing, the government may reduce the cost of self control and thus increase indi-
viduals’ welfare by taxing current labor in the ﬁrst period. However, such a tax also aﬀects
the commitment utility from the choice. To analyze how the presence of temptation aﬀects the
overall design of eﬃcient tax policies is the aim of the next section.
12Note that the cost of self control equals zero in the second period as, absent any bequest motive, the individual
consumes everything available (see Kumru and Tran (2012)).
13More precisely, making use of the Envelope theorem, we get ∂SSC
∂φ
= λE > 0 and ∂SSC
∂ω1
= λE > 0.
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3 Second-Best Policy
In the following analysis, we characterize eﬃcient tax policies with respect to education and
labor in relation to the taxation of non-qualiﬁed labor when individuals face temptation in
inter-temporal decision making.
The government’s problem is to raise some exogenous amount of revenue T by using four
linear and distorting tax instruments that are assumed to be available. These instruments are
modeled as the diﬀerence between prices before and after taxes and are levied on period i’s labor
income, on the return to saving, and on the cost of tuition. Speciﬁcally, denoting by ω1, ω2, ρ, φ
the endogenous prices after taxes and subsidies and by w1, w2, r, f the corresponding exogenous
prices before taxes and subsidies, respectively, taxes are deﬁned as follows: the tax on period i’s
labor income equals wi−ωi, the tax on capital income r− ρ, and the tax on the cost of tuition
φ− f . A negative value implies that the tax is eﬀectively a subsidy. The government’s budget
is assumed to be balanced:
(w1 − ω1)(L1 −E) + (φ− f)E + [(w2 − ω2)H(E)L2 + (r − ρ)S]/r
=
(9)
(w1 − ω1)L1 + [(φ+ ω1)− (f + w1)]E +
[
w2
r
− ω2
ρ
]
HL2 +
[1
ρ
− 1
r
]
C2 = T. (20)
The planner maximizes the representative taxpayer’s utility (4) in the quantities C1, C2, L1, L2, E
and prices ω1, ω2, ρ, φ subject to the behavioral constraints (7), (11)-(14), the individual budget
constraint (10) and the government’s budget constraint (20). Assume that the planner’s maxi-
mization is well behaved and, following Richter (2011), that eﬃciency is characterized in terms
of wedges. Let
∆L1 ≡
w1 − ω1
ω1
(21)
denote the wedge on non-qualiﬁed labor,
∆C2 ≡
r − ρ
ρ
(22)
the wedge on second period consumption,
∆L2 ≡
w2/r − ω2/ρ
ω2/ρ
(23)
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the wedge on qualiﬁed labor and
∆E ≡ w2H
′L2/r − f − w1
φ+ ω1
=
(14)
w2/r
ω2/ρ
− f + w1
φ+ ω1
(24)
the wedge on education. Second period consumption (education; qualiﬁed labor) is eﬀectively
subsidized if∆C2 (∆E ; ∆L2) is negative. Furthermore, according to (24), the wedge on education
can be decomposed into two parts: the ratio of present returns before and after taxes and
subsidies and the ratio of costs before and after taxes and subsidies. If these ratios are of
same size, the wedge vanishes. It is important to note, however, that a negative value of
∆E can be achieved by a combination of all four policy instruments. More precisely, eﬀective
subsidization is clearly reached by the statutory subsidization of the cost of tuition, but may also
be achieved by (i) increasing the tax on non-qualiﬁed labor and thus reducing the opportunity
cost of education, (ii) by reducing the tax on qualiﬁed labor and thus increasing the return to
education, and ﬁnally (iii) by taxing savings and thus increasing the return to education (cf.
Richter (2011, p.4)).
In order to simplify notation, we make the following deﬁnitions: ν1 ≡ L1V ′′1 /V ′1 > 0 is the
elasticity of marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed labor resulting from the commitment utility, i.e.,
the reciprocal of the wage elasticity and ηη ≡ Eη′/η the second-order elasticity of the earnings
function.
Proposition 1. If ω1, ω2, ρ, and φ are optimally chosen, then
∆E
(1 + λ)∆L1 − λν1
= −ηη
ν1
(25)
Proof: See Appendix.
Equation (25) corroborates several important results of the existing literature.14 Speciﬁcally, as
has been demonstrated by Richter (2009), and by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2011) in models with heterogenous taxpayers, equation (25) implies that education
should not be distorted (∆E = 0) if the elasticity of the earnings function, η, is constant.
Furthermore, if self control problems are absent, i.e. λ = 0, equation (25) corresponds to the
second order elasticity rule derived by Richter (2011).
14Richter (2013, Fig.2) uses data from the OECD to calculate tax wedges on non-qualiﬁed labor and education.
According to his ﬁndings, about one third of all OECD countries tax tertiary education in eﬀective terms. The
corresponding numbers for ∆E range from -0.8 to 0.5. Furthermore, the wedge on non-qualiﬁed labor ∆L1 is
positive in all countries and takes on values in the range of 0.05 to 0.45.
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The contribution of the present analysis, however, is to extend the inverse elasticity rule
when individuals face temptation. In order to interpret (25), we assume that (i) non-qualiﬁed
labor income is taxed (∆L1 > 0) and (ii) that the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing
(ηη > 0).
While the numerator in the bracketed expression on the left hand side of (25) is unambigu-
ously positive, the denominator consists of two parts: The wedge on non-qualiﬁed labor and a
self control eﬀect which captures how taxing non-qualiﬁed labor aﬀects the cost of self control.
With λ = 0, education should eﬀectively be subsidized. With λ > 0, however, the conﬁguration
of the tax policy on education turns out to be ambiguous. The denominator can be positive or
negative depending on the relative size of the elasticity of marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed
labor, ν1:
∆L1(1 + λ)− λν1 ? 0 ⇔ ν1 7
(1 + λ)
λ
∆L1 (26)
Hence, if ν1 is suﬃciently low (large), eﬃcient education policy calls for subsidizing (taxing)
education. Moreover, whether education should be subsidized more or less heavily as compared
to the benchmark without temptation critically depends on the size of ν1. Just note that
∆L1(1 + λ)− λν1 ? ∆L1 ⇔ ∆L1 ? ν1. (27)
The intuition behind these ﬁndings is the following. Taxing non-qualiﬁed labor income generates
two eﬀects on individuals’ lifetime utility: First, the commitment utility from the choice declines
as the amount of disposable resources decreases, thereby reducing earnings and consumption in
the ﬁrst period. Moreover, a lower return to non-qualiﬁed labor discourages working, which, in
turn, reduces earnings and consumption even further. Second, as has been shown in the previous
section, the cost of self control declines as well. Hence, the net eﬀect depends on the relative
strength of these two changes. Our ﬁndings show that the net eﬀect turns out to be positive, i.e.
individuals’ lifetime utility increases, if the elasticity of marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed labor
(the reciprocal of the wage elasticity) is suﬃciently large. In this case, income taxation implies
only a modest increase in leisure (relative to the decrease in consumption), which generates
a substantial reduction in the maximum temptation utility, and, consequently, in the cost of
self control. On the contrary, if the elasticity of marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed labor is
suﬃciently small, income taxation brings about a substantial increase in leisure. This, in turn,
generates only a small reduction in the cost of self control and thus a reduction in individuals’
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lifetime utility. Therefore, the government has a strong incentive to subsidize education in order
to lower the cost of self control.
Consequently, ν1 has a double role in determining optimal education policies: (i) it is part
of the inverse elasticity rule of optimal taxation and (ii) it is a key factor in shaping the level of
the self control cost which, in turn, determines the dynamic redistribution of resources between
the present and the future.
In sum, the planner trades oﬀ the objective of maximizing the social ability rent against
the objectives of minimizing the eﬃciency loss resulting from distorted choices of the utility-
generating quantities C1, C2, L1, and L2 (as in Richter (2009)) and the eﬃciency gains resulting
from reductions in the cost of self control. If the speed at which working disutility increases is
suﬃciently low, ∆L1 > ν1, then, the reduction in the self control cost by taxing non-qualiﬁed
labor is modest and the planer should additionally subsidize second period consumption, which,
in turn, implies that education should eﬀectively be subsidized.15
We now turn to the analysis of eﬃcient labor taxation. In order to illustrate the eﬀect of
temptation on optimal policies, we assume H(E) = Eη¯. In the appendix we show that wage
taxes are second best if they satisfy
(1− η¯)ν2 − η¯
ν1
= ∆L2∆L1(1 + λ)− λν1
(28)
Note that the numerator on the left hand side of equation (28) is positive by assumption
(recall equation (18)). The above equation contains several familiar results as a special case.
Speciﬁcally, for both λ = η¯ = 0, equation (28) equates to the inverse elasticity rule which
requires setting wage taxes inversely proportional to the corresponding wage elasticities of labor
supply. Furthermore, if only λ = 0, equation (28) corresponds to the extended inverse elasticity
rule which accounts for endogenous education (see Richter (2009, eq.(13))). The presence of
temptation, however, implies that non-qualiﬁed labor should be taxed more heavily relative to
qualiﬁed labor if the wage elasticity of non-qualiﬁed labor is suﬃciently large, that is, if the
elasticity of marginal disutility of non-qualiﬁed labor, ν1, is small enough.16 In this case, taxing
non-qualiﬁed labor lowers the cost of self-control and thus the resulting welfare loss. Moreover,
15As mentioned in the introduction, an alternative modelling approach of temptation is the one developed by
Laibson (1997) where individuals have time inconsistent preferences. Lee (2012) uses this ‘hyperbolic discounting’
model to study optimal education policies and ﬁnds that subsidizing education eases individual’s self-control
problems. His model, however, abstracts from savings and labor supply decisions which turn out to be important
in the present framework.
16More precisely, ∆L1 ? (1 + λ)∆L1 − λν1 ⇔ ν1 ? ∆L1 .
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if ∆L1 > 0 and if the strength of temptation, λ, is suﬃciently strong, eﬃcient labor taxation
calls for subsidizing qualiﬁed labor, i.e. ∆L2 < 0. The nature of this latter results is generally
in line with Krusell et al. (2010) who show that taxation of capital can be welfare improving
and that the presence of temptation calls for subsidizing second period consumption.
4 Conclusions
This paper extends the inverse elasticity rule of optimal taxation when individuals face tempta-
tion in inter-temporal decision making. Eﬃcient education policy requires subsidizing education
only if self control problems are suﬃciently severe and the elasticity of the earnings function
is increasing in education. Analogously, eﬃcient labor taxation calls for subsidizing qualiﬁed
labor to increase second period consumption, if the strength of temptation is suﬃciently large.
A key element in our setting is the sensitivity of individuals to taxes which, in turn, renders
the cost of self control endogenous to tax policy. Hence, even if the strength of temptation
is large, the total cost of self control might be low for a strong individual response to taxa-
tion. Consequently, elasticities matter for two reasons: (i) the inverse elasticity rule of optimal
taxation and (ii) the intensity of the eﬀect of taxation in determining the cost of self control.
Our ﬁndings highlight the potential importance of temptation and non-standard prefer-
ences for the design of optimal policies. While Richter (2009, 2011) has shown that education
should eﬀectively be subsidized if the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in educa-
tion, we demonstrate that this result only holds if temptation problems are suﬃciently severe.
By contrast, if temptation problems are not suﬃciently severe, eﬃcient education policy calls
for taxing education. Moreover, our results point to a possible complementarity relation be-
tween non-qualiﬁed and qualiﬁed labor taxation. Countries having a large average elasticity of
marginal disutility of labor (a low wage elasticity) may only generate small reductions in labor
supply when taxing non-qualiﬁed labor, which, in turn, makes taxation of qualiﬁed (relative
to non-qualiﬁed) labor more likely. This may help to understand why developed countries, in
which labor supply is less elastic than in developing ones,17 show relatively high levels of taxa-
tion on qualiﬁed labor (i.e., high income groups) and thus more progressive income tax systems
17Heckman and Pagés (2004) note that informal workers often evade taxation which, in turn, helps explaining
why the relevant labor supply to the formal sector in developing countries turns out to be more elastic than in
developed ones. See Fuest and Riedel (2009) and Besley and Persson (2013) for recent surveys of the literature
on taxation and development.
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compared to developing countries 18.
Our results are derived within the context of a model that is general in some respects,
but of course it depends on other, less general assumptions. For example, we have ruled out
credibility problems of government policies. In the context of education policies, time consistent
policies have been studied, e.g., by Boadway et al. (1996) and Andersson and Konrad (2003).
Moreover, our analysis is based on the Ramsey approach to optimal taxation, whereas the so-
called Mirrlees approach is used by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2011). Finally, the analysis could be extended to allow for heterogenous taxpayers, see e.g.
Richter (2009, Sec.3). We leave a more thorough analysis of these important issues for future
research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The planner’s problem can be simpliﬁed by replacing ω1 by V ′1 and Lˆ1 by L1 (as ω1 = V ′1(L1) =
V ′1(Lˆ1)). The restated planner’s problem is
max[V ′1(L1)L1 − V1(L1) + ω2H(E)L2/ρ− (φ+ V ′1(L1))E − C2/ρ (29)
+ u(C2)− V2(L2) + λ[V ′1(L1)L1 − V1(L1) + ω2H(E)L2/ρ
− (φ+ V ′1(L1))E − C2/ρ]− λ[V ′1(L1)L1 − V1(L1)]]
in φ,L1, ω2, E,C2, ρ, L2, subject to
(1 + λ)ω2H(E)/ρ = V ′2(L2), (α) (30)
ω2H
′(E)L2/ρ = φ+ V ′1(L1), (µ) (31)
1 + λ
u′(C2)
= ρ, (κ) (32)
[w1−V ′1(L1)]L1+[(φ+V ′1(L1))−(f+w1)]E+
[
w2
r
− ω2
ρ
]
H(E)L2+
[1
ρ
− 1
r
]
C2 = T. (γ) (33)
18Piketty and Quian (2009), Gemmell and Morrissey (2005), and Schmitt (2003) among others ﬁnd that many
tax systems in developing countries are substantially less progressive than those in developed ones.
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The simpliﬁed ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to φ,L1, ω2 and E are as follows:19
∂
∂φ
: µ = (γ − (1 + λ))E; (34)
∂
∂L1
: γ(w1 − V ′1) =(34) (γ − 1)L1V
′′
1 ; (35)
∂
∂ω2
: 1 + λ =
(34)
γ − α 1 + λ
L2(1− η) ; (36)
∂
∂E
: γ[f + w1 − w2H ′L2/r]
=
(34),(36)
[γ − (1 + λ)] [φ+ V ′1 − ηω2H ′L2/ρ+ ω2H ′′EL2/ρ] (37)
= [γ − (1 + λ)]
[
1− η + H
′′E
H ′
]
(φ+ V ′1) = [γ − (1 + λ)]
Eη′
η
(φ+ ω1);
Dividing (35) by V ′1 and (37) by φ+ ω1 and solving the resulting equation system yields (25).
Proof of equations (28):
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the simpliﬁed planner’s problem with respect to ω2 and C2 are:
∂
∂ω2
: α = (1− η)L21 + λ (γ − (1 + λ)) (38)
∂
∂C2
: α 1 + λ
L2(1− η) =(36) γ/(1 + ∆C2) + κ
u′′(C2)
u′(C2)2
(1 + λ) ρ− u′(C2)ρ; (39)
The latter equation can be simpliﬁed by inserting equations (22), (32) and (38):
∂
∂C2
: 0 = γ(1/ρ− 1/r)− κρu′′(C2)/u′(C2) (40)
Moreover, the simpliﬁed ﬁrst order condition with respect to L2 is given by
∂
∂L2
: 0 =
(34)
γ∆L2 + η(γ − (1 + λ))− α
V ′′2 (L2)ρ
ω2H(E)
(41)
Substitute (38) into (41) and make use of (13) to get
0 = γ∆L2 + (γ − (1 + λ))(η − (1− η)ν2). (42)
19Note that the proof does not rely on the derivatives with respect to L2, C2 and ρ.
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Similarly, substituting (36) into (35) and dividing the resulting equation by V ′1 yields
γ∆L1 = ν1α
1 + λ
L2(1− η) + ν1λ. (43)
Finally, insert (38) into (43) and rearrange terms to reach
γ∆L1 = λν1 + ν1(γ − (1 + λ)). (44)
Solving the resulting equation system (42), (44) and making use of H(E) = Eη¯ yields (28).
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